

PERFORMANCE AUDIT  
OF THE  
WESTERN WAYNE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY  
AND CAMP BRIGHTON

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

October 2000

## EXECUTIVE DIGEST

# WESTERN WAYNE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND CAMP BRIGHTON

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### INTRODUCTION

This report, issued in October 2000, contains the results of our performance audit\* of the Western Wayne Correctional Facility (WWCF) and Camp Brighton (CB), Department of Corrections (DOC).

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### AUDIT PURPOSE

This performance audit was conducted as part of the constitutional responsibility of the Office of the Auditor General. Performance audits are conducted on a priority basis related to the potential for improving effectiveness\* and efficiency\*.

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### BACKGROUND

WWCF, located in Wayne County, and CB, located in Livingston County, are under the jurisdiction of DOC. The warden, who is the chief administrative officer for these facilities, is a classified State employee under the State's civil service system. The warden is appointed by the DOC director.

The two facilities share a records office, a personnel office, a mailroom, and a training office. The deputy warden oversees custody (safety and security), housing, and prisoner programs. The administrative officer oversees

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

the business office, physical plant, fire safety, warehouse, and food service operations.

The mission\* of the facilities is to protect the public by providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. WWCF, which opened in 1985, is a medium security (level III)\* facility for males with a capacity of 775 prisoners. Prisoners are housed in individual cells within a secured, double-fenced perimeter that includes motion detection systems, two gun towers, and an armed response vehicle that constantly patrols the facility perimeter. CB, which was placed under the jurisdiction of WWCF in September 1997, houses 270 minimum security (level I)\* male prisoners within a fenced perimeter.

WWCF is the intake center for male offenders who have either violated their parole or correction center placement and for prisoners who transferred from other institutions who need mental health treatment.

For fiscal year 1998-99, WWCF and CB operating expenditures were approximately \$19.2 million and \$3.7 million, respectively. As of September 30, 1999, WWCF and CB had 317 and 55 employees, respectively.

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AUDIT OBJECTIVES,  
CONCLUSIONS, AND  
NOTEWORTHY  
ACCOMPLISHMENTS

**Audit Objective:** To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of WWCF's and CB's safety and security operations.

**Conclusion:** We concluded that WWCF's and CB's safety and security operations were generally effective and efficient. However, we noted reportable conditions\* related to cell searches\*, employee searches, prisoner

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

shakedowns\*, tool controls, security key controls, gate manifest\* controls, prisoner telephone call monitoring, and communication with the community (Findings 1 through 8).

**Noteworthy Accomplishments:** WWCF recently implemented physical plant improvements that improved the facility's safety and security. These improvements included installation of two new gun towers, new concertina wire on the security fence, and a new security camera system to monitor the facility grounds and perimeter.

**Audit Objective:** To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of WWCF's and CB's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

**Conclusion:** We concluded that WWCF's and CB's prisoner care and maintenance operations were generally effective and efficient. However, we noted reportable conditions related to the inventory management system and emergency backup generator testing (Findings 9 through 10).

**Noteworthy Accomplishments:** WWCF is the intake center for male offenders who have violated their parole or placement and for prisoners who need mental health treatment. Yearly intake of prisoners has increased 35% from 3,634 in 1996 to 4,894 in 1998. WWCF has streamlined and computerized this process to accommodate the increased work load without the use of additional resources.

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AUDIT SCOPE AND  
METHODOLOGY

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of the Western Wayne Correctional Facility and

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

Camp Brighton. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

Our methodology included examination of WWCF and CB records and activities for the period October 1996 through October 1999.

We conducted a preliminary review of WWCF and CB operations. This included discussions with various WWCF and CB staff regarding their functions and responsibilities and a review of program records, DOC policy directives, and WWCF and CB operating procedures. To gain an understanding of WWCF and CB activities and to form a basis for selecting certain operations for audit, we conducted tests of records related to safety and security, prison operations, prisoner care, and maintenance activities for compliance with applicable policies and procedures and program effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, we developed a survey (see supplemental information) requesting input from certain individuals and businesses regarding their association with the facilities.

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**AGENCY RESPONSES**

Our audit report includes 9 findings and 10 corresponding recommendations. WWCF agreed with all of the findings and informed us that it either has complied or will comply with the recommendations.

October 5, 2000

Mr. Bill Martin, Director  
Department of Corrections  
Grandview Plaza  
Lansing, Michigan

Dear Mr. Martin:

This is our report on the performance audit of the Western Wayne Correctional Facility and Camp Brighton, Department of Corrections.

This report contains our executive digest; description of agency; audit objectives, scope, and methodology and agency responses; comments, findings, recommendations, and agency preliminary responses; a description of survey and summary of survey responses, presented as supplemental information; and a glossary of acronyms and terms.

Our comments, findings, and recommendations are organized by audit objective. The agency preliminary responses were taken from the agency's responses subsequent to our audit fieldwork. The *Michigan Compiled Laws* and administrative procedures require that the audited agency develop a formal response within 60 days after release of the audit report.

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to us during this audit.

Sincerely,

Thomas H. McTavish, C.P.A.  
Auditor General

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## Description of Agency

The Western Wayne Correctional Facility (WWCF), located in Wayne County, and Camp Brighton (CB), located in Livingston County, are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. The warden, who is the chief administrative officer for these facilities, is a classified State employee under the State's civil service system. The warden is appointed by the Department of Corrections director.

The two facilities share a records office, a personnel office, a mailroom, and a training office. The deputy warden oversees custody (safety and security), housing, and prisoner programs. The administrative officer oversees the business office, physical plant, fire safety, warehouse, and food service operations.

The mission of the facilities is to protect the public by providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. WWCF, which opened in 1985, is a medium security (level III) facility for males with a capacity of 775 prisoners. Prisoners are housed in individual cells within a secured, double-fenced perimeter that includes motion detection systems, two gun towers, and an armed response vehicle that constantly patrols the facility perimeter. CB, which was placed under the jurisdiction of WWCF in September 1997, houses 270 minimum security (level I) male prisoners within a fenced perimeter.

WWCF is the intake center for male offenders who have violated either their parole or their correction center placement and for prisoners who transferred from other institutions who need mental health treatment.

For fiscal year 1998-99, WWCF and CB operating expenditures were approximately \$19.2 million and \$3.7 million, respectively. As of September 30, 1999, WWCF and CB had 317 and 55 employees, respectively.

## Audit Objectives, Scope, and Methodology and Agency Responses

### Audit Objectives

Our performance audit of the Western Wayne Correctional Facility (WWCF) and Camp Brighton (CB), Department of Corrections (DOC), had the following objectives:

1. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of WWCF's and CB's safety and security operations.
2. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of WWCF's and CB's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

### Audit Scope

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of the Western Wayne Correctional Facility and Camp Brighton. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

### Audit Methodology

Our audit procedures were conducted from May through November 1999 and included examination of WWCF and CB records and activities for the period October 1996 through October 1999.

To establish our audit objectives and to gain an understanding of WWCF and CB activities, we conducted a preliminary review of WWCF and CB operations. This included discussions with various WWCF and CB staff regarding their functions and responsibilities and a review of program records, DOC policy directives, and WWCF and CB operating procedures. To gain an understanding of WWCF and CB activities and to form a basis for selecting certain operations for audit, we conducted tests of records related to safety and security, prison operations, prisoner care, and maintenance activities for compliance with applicable policies and procedures and for program effectiveness and efficiency.

To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of WWCF's and CB's safety and security operations, we conducted tests of records related to firearms inventories and employee firearm qualifications at WWCF. Also, we examined records related to cell searches, employee searches, and prisoner shakedowns. On a test basis, we inventoried critical and dangerous tools and keys. In addition, we reviewed visitor safety, documentation of items taken into and out of the facilities, and prisoner telephone call monitoring.

To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of WWCF and CB prisoner and maintenance operations, we conducted tests of records and reviewed preventive maintenance, disaster management, inventory controls, fire safety procedures, emergency backup generator tests, food service, prisoner care, and cash receipts. In addition, we analyzed prisoner store financial information and inventory controls and reviewed controls over the prisoner funds accounting system.

In addition, we developed surveys (see supplemental information) requesting input from certain individuals and businesses regarding their association with the facilities.

#### Agency Responses

Our audit report includes 9 findings and 10 corresponding recommendations. WWCF agreed with all of the findings and informed us that it either has complied or will comply with the recommendations.

The agency preliminary response which follows each recommendation in our report was taken from the agency's written comments and oral discussion subsequent to our audit fieldwork. Section 18.1462 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws* and Department of Management and Budget Administrative Guide procedure 1280.02 require DOC to develop a formal response to our audit findings and recommendations within 60 days after release of the audit report.

# COMMENTS, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSES

## SAFETY AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

### COMMENT

**Background:** Western Wayne Correctional Facility (WWCF) and Camp Brighton (CB) operate under the policy directives established by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as well as operating procedures that are developed at each facility. WWCF and CB are responsible for providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. WWCF operates within a secured, electronically monitored, double-fenced perimeter that includes motion detection systems, two gun towers, and an armed response vehicle that constantly patrols the facility perimeter. CB is a minimum security prison camp surrounded by a fence. DOC policies and facility operating procedures have been implemented to help ensure the security of tools, keys, and firearms. WWCF and CB staff conduct periodic searches of housing units, prisoners, and prisoner belongings to detect contraband\* . All visitors must register when entering the facilities, must go through a metal detector, and are subject to search. DOC policy provides for the periodic random searches of employees entering and exiting the facilities.

**Audit Objective:** To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of WWCF's and CB's safety and security operations.

**Conclusion:** **We concluded that WWCF's and CB's safety and security operations were generally effective and efficient.** However, we noted reportable conditions related to cell searches, employee searches, prisoner shakedowns, tool controls, security key controls, gate manifest controls, prisoner telephone call monitoring, and communication with the community.

**Noteworthy Accomplishments:** WWCF recently implemented physical plant improvements that improved the facility's safety and security. These improvements

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.

included installation of two new gun towers, new concertina wire on the security fence, and a new security camera system to monitor the facility grounds and perimeter.

## **FINDING**

### **1. Cell Searches**

WWCF should ensure that housing unit officers\* perform and properly document the required number of prisoner cell searches.

DOC policy directive 04.04.110 and WWCF procedure require that each housing unit officer perform a minimum of three cell searches per day. The procedure also requires that all cells are searched at least once per month and that documentation be retained to support the cell searches performed. These searches are necessary to help detect prisoner contraband and provide for the safety and security of staff and other prisoners.

WWCF maintained cell search logs to record the number of cell searches performed. This data was compiled and submitted to the warden in monthly reports. Our review of these reports and supporting documentation for three housing units for the three-month period ended May 1999 disclosed:

- a. WWCF reported that the housing unit officers in the three housing units performed only 4,596 (69%) of the required 6,624 cell searches during the three-month period. However, our review of the cell search logs noted that only 1,471 (22%) of the required cell searches were recorded. WWCF informed us that it retained only some of the documentation after the monthly reports were submitted.
- b. Numerous alterations were made to the cell search logs at one housing unit. For example, the cell search log for March 1999 appeared to have been changed from an original date of August 1998.

We compared 10 prisoner names from WWCF's March 1999 cell search log to the Corrections Management Information System to determine where these prisoners were housed during this month. None of the 10 prisoners were

\* See glossary at end of report for definition

housed in the cells noted on the cell search log. In fact, the Corrections Management Information System indicated that 5 of the 10 prisoners were in other DOC facilities and that the other 5 prisoners had been released from the prison system.

Cell searches are performed to detect and confiscate contraband, including weapons, dangerous tools, and illegal drugs. This serious compromise of prison security procedures potentially places prison staff and prisoners in harm's way.

Conducting prisoner cell searches contributes to the safety of staff and prisoners. Also, proper documentation is necessary for WWCF to effectively monitor the cell search process.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

We recommend that WWCF ensure that housing unit officers perform and properly document the required number of prisoner cell searches.

We also recommend that WWCF investigate the alterations made to the cell search logs and initiate disciplinary measures, as appropriate.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

WWCF agrees and informed us that it has complied. WWCF informed us that it has adopted use of a standard DOC form for cell searches to ensure compliance. WWCF also informed us that it has conducted a thorough investigation into the isolated incident involving one unit and that appropriate corrective action was taken.

In addition, DOC will study establishment of a standard record retention period for cell search documentation.

## **FINDING**

### **2. Employee Searches**

WWCF should ensure that each employee entering the WWCF and CB security perimeter area is subject to a random search.

DOC policy directives and WWCF operating procedures do not specify a frequency for employee searches and have not designated methods to ensure random selection for a search.

Our review of WWCF and CB employee search logs for a two-month period ended in April 1999 disclosed:

- a. WWCF periodically performed patdown searches of some of its employees entering the security perimeter using an arbitrary selection process. Records showed that custody staff\* at WWCF performed 2,106 employee patdown searches during the two-month period, which included searches of 194 (87%) of the 224 corrections officer staff. However, only 47 (55%) of the 86 nonofficer staff who routinely entered the secured perimeter area were searched during the two-month period.

WWCF did require all employees entering the security perimeter to enter through a metal detector. However, walking through a metal detector does not supplant an employee search. Subjecting all employees to an unannounced random search would help ensure the safety and security of staff and prisoners.

- b. As part of CB's monthly monitoring exercise, CB performs patdown searches of a small sample of its staff. All CB's employees enter the security perimeter. However, only certain employees were subjected to the searches. For example, some noncustody personnel were never searched. The effectiveness of searches as a deterrent could be improved if all employees were subjected to the random searches. CB records showed that only 37 (65%) of its 57 employees were searched during the two-month period.

\* See glossary at end of report for definition.



Random searches of employees who routinely work inside the security perimeter can be an effective deterrent to contraband entering the institution. DOC has informed us that it is in the process of developing a policy to ensure random searches of employees.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that WWCF ensure that each employee entering the WWCF and CB security perimeter area is subject to a random search.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

WWCF agrees and will comply by enhancing WWCF's and CB's schedule of employee patdown searches to ensure randomness. However, DOC intends to enhance its employee search policy directive by requiring fewer but more thorough clothed body searches of employees based on computer-generated random samples.

### **FINDING**

#### **3. Prisoner Shakedowns**

WWCF should ensure that custody staff perform and properly document the required number of prisoner shakedowns.

DOC policy directive 04.04.110 and facility procedure require that each custody staff member with direct prisoner contact perform a minimum of five prisoner shakedowns per day. These searches are necessary to detect prisoner contraband and to provide for the safety and security of staff and prisoners.

We reviewed WWCF documentation for prisoner shakedowns during the month of May 1999. Records show that only 1,903 (68%) of the required 2,790 prisoner shakedowns were completed.

Conducting prisoner shakedowns improves WWCF's ability to ensure the safety of staff and prisoners. Also, proper documentation is necessary for WWCF to effectively monitor the prisoner shakedown process.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that WWCF ensure that custody staff perform and properly document the required number of prisoner shakedowns.

## **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

WWCF agrees and informed us that it has complied. WWCF informed us that it has increased its efforts in the area of supervisory monitoring to ensure compliance.

## **FINDING**

### **4. Tool Control**

WWCF needs to improve its controls over critical and dangerous tools.

DOC policy directive 04.04.120 requires the tool control officer to maintain a complete, up-to-date master inventory listing; establish limits for tools in each storage area; and perform an annual audit of the tool inventory. Also, tool storage area officers are required to complete daily tool reports and submit them weekly to the tool control officer.

Our review of the control process of 3 tool storage areas disclosed:

- a. WWCF did not maintain a complete, up-to-date master tool list. A master tool inventory list is the control record for the tool inventory maintained in each area of the facility. Additionally, each area of the facility is required to maintain a tool inventory list. We noted the following discrepancies in 2 of the 3 tool storage areas:
  - (1) WWCF did not maintain a master tool inventory list for the dental area. We noted 58 tools on the dental area's tool inventory list that were not included in the master tool inventory list.
  - (2) WWCF had 15 items on the master tool inventory list for the health care area. However, none of the 15 items were on the health care area's tool inventory list and the health care area had 45 items on its tool inventory list that were not included on the master tool inventory list.

- b. The tool control officer did not perform the required annual tool audits. WWCF is required to perform an audit of the tool inventory each year. However, WWCF records showed that an annual tool audit had not been performed since December 1996. We were subsequently informed that WWCF had completed an annual tool inventory in November and December 1999, after the completion of our fieldwork.
- c. WWCF weekly tool reports for critical or dangerous tools were not always submitted to the tool control officer. We reviewed weekly inventories for January, February, and March 1999 for the tool storage areas. WWCF records showed that only 55 (23%) of 240 required weekly tool inventory reports were submitted.

Proper control over tool inventory helps to ensure that all critical and dangerous tools are accounted for and that any lost or missing tool will be detected and recovered in a timely manner. This will also help ensure the safety and security of the staff and prisoners.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend WWCF improve its controls over its critical and dangerous tools.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

WWCF agrees and informed us that it has complied. WWCF informed us that it has updated the master tool inventory list to accurately reflect the tool inventory maintained in the dental and health care areas.

WWCF informed us that it has taken steps to ensure that weekly tool reports are monitored on a monthly basis. In addition, we were informed that Department heads were notified by the deputy warden when any areas within their area of responsibility fail to submit a report.

### **FINDING**

#### **5. Security Key Controls**

WWCF needs to improve its controls over security keys.

DOC policy directive 04.04.100 and facility procedure require that each facility maintain a continuous, up-to-date key control system. This system should identify each key number, lock/location accessible by each key, and the ring to which it is assigned. Also, WWCF is required to account for all security keys at the beginning and end of each shift, to test emergency keys monthly, and to inventory all security keys semiannually.

Our review of security and emergency keys at WWCF disclosed:

- a. WWCF did not maintain a continuous, up-to-date key control system. We selected a sample of 25 employees and compared their key rings with the master key listing. Only 14 (56%) of the 25 keys rings reviewed agreed with the master key listing.
- b. WWCF did not check key boxes during each shift as required. We reviewed the daily key inventory sheets for 6 days during the period April through September 1999. WWCF records showed that keys were accounted for in only 51 (71%) of the required 72 checks.
- c. WWCF did not maintain complete documentation for the required semiannual physical inventories of security keys. A complete physical inventory is required to be performed in January and July of each year. Entries were recorded in a logbook stating that the inventories were performed, but WWCF did not maintain any detailed documentation.

A key control system with proper controls and accountability is essential to help ensure the safety and security of staff and to reduce the possibility of prisoner escapes.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that WWCF improve its controls over security keys.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

WWCF agrees and informed us that it has complied. WWCF informed us that it has reconciled the key rings with the master key inventory. WWCF also informed

us that the keys are currently inventoried each shift and documentation for the semi-annual inventory has been developed.

## **FINDING**

### **6. Gate Manifest Controls**

WWCF needs to improve its controls over gate manifests.

WWCF operating procedures require gate manifests to include a complete description of the transported items, authorized approval, an inspection by a gate officer, and a verification of items returned through the gates. Gate manifests provide a record system of items (critical and dangerous tools, supplies, materials, etc.) entering and leaving the facility. Gate manifests are used to control and prevent the introduction of contraband and the theft of State property from the facility.

Our review of the controls over gate manifests at WWCF and CB for the month of January 1999 disclosed:

- a. Of 78 manifests, 32 (41%) had critical omissions, with several having multiple critical omissions. We noted that 16 manifests did not list the individual that carried the items back through the gate, 9 manifests omitted the name of the individual carrying items into the facility, 6 manifests did not indicate whether the item was entering or leaving the facility, 6 manifests did not indicate the individual completing the manifest, 2 manifests did not indicate whether the items were taken through the main gate or the sallyport\* , and 1 manifest did not have the date recorded. As a result of these omissions, WWCF did not have complete documentation for inspections made by gate officers. Thus, WWCF did not have sufficient assurance regarding the disposition of items entering and leaving the facility.
- b. WWCF did not ensure that CB properly controlled the movement of critical and dangerous items. WWCF became responsible for the operations at CB in

\* See glossary at end of report for definition

September 1997. At the time of our review, CB had not implemented the use of gate manifests into its operation. Without gate manifests, CB cannot control the movement of critical and dangerous items entering and leaving the security perimeter.

Proper monitoring of gate manifests can help prevent contraband from entering the security perimeter and help determine whether critical and dangerous items are being left inside the facility. Compiling control logs and verifying the numerical sequence of manifests issued would increase accountability over gate manifests and contribute to the safety of staff and prisoners.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that WWCF improve its controls over gate manifests.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

WWCF agrees and informed us that it has complied. WWCF informed us that its inspector now monitors deficiencies to ensure proper completion of gate manifests.

WWCF will also comply by ensuring that CB implements a gate manifest procedure.

### **FINDING**

#### **7. Communication With the Community**

CB should establish a system to help provide for timely communication with local residents who live in the vicinity of the prison camp.

DOC policy directives require correctional facilities to establish a system of communication with the local community for relaying DOC goals and policies, receiving and responding to community concerns and ideas, and disseminating and gathering information. The DOC office informed us that this policy does not apply to the prison camps program.

A transfer placed CB under the control of the WWCF warden in September 1997. When CB was under the control of the prison camps program, camps were not

required to communicate with nearby residents. However, based on our survey responses, community members appeared to be interested in what is happening at CB. Fifteen residents who live in the vicinity of CB voiced concerns relating to safety and security issues and the lack of communication.

DOC has an obligation to inform the public of its goals, purpose, and role. Also, the success of correctional programs can be adversely affected by the lack of public understanding and support. It would be in DOC's best interest to establish a system of communication with its neighbors.

Planned and continuing public information and education programs help achieve greater community involvement, understanding, and support of DOC goals, purpose, and role.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that the warden review the feasibility of establishing a system to help provide for timely communication with local residents who live in the vicinity of CB.

### **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

WWCF agrees and informed us that it has complied by establishing a community liaison committee for CB.

## **PRISONER CARE AND MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS**

### **COMMENT**

**Background:** WWCF and CB are responsible for providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. WWCF and CB have developed procedures involving preventive maintenance, disaster planning, fire safety, food service activities, power plant operations, prisoner accounting, and prisoner store operations.

**Audit Objective:** To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of WWCF's and CB's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

**Conclusion:** We concluded that WWCF's and CB's prisoner care and maintenance operations were generally effective and efficient. However, we noted reportable conditions related to the inventory management system and emergency backup generator testing.

**Noteworthy Accomplishments:** WWCF is the intake center for male offenders who have violated their parole or placement and for prisoners who need mental health treatment. Yearly intake of prisoners has increased 35% from 3,634 in 1996 to 4,894 in 1998. WWCF has streamlined and computerized this process to accommodate the increased work load without the use of additional resources.

## **FINDING**

### **8. Inventory Management System**

WWCF needs to establish an inventory management system to properly control and manage the revolving fund inventory.

Department of Management and Budget Administrative Guide procedure 1270.04 requires WWCF to have an inventory management system. An inventory management system is needed to monitor inventory levels and to safeguard the inventory assets.

WWCF informed us that it had abandoned its automated inventory management system because system glitches caused inaccurate reporting of inventory. This inventory management system had been upgraded, but WWCF decided that the upgrade did not meet its needs and did not purchase it. However, WWCF had not established an alternate system to account for and control inventory. As a result, WWCF did not have adequate controls for its inventory of over \$500,000 in supplies and materials.

Without an inventory management system, WWCF cannot determine if items are missing or stolen, which stock items are excessive, which stock items have not been used for extensive periods of time, or when stock items need replenishing.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend WWCF establish an inventory management system to properly control and manage the revolving fund inventory.



## **AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

WWCF agrees and will comply. WWCF has been selected as a pilot site for an improved automated system which is not yet available. In the interim, WWCF informed us that it has implemented a computerized spreadsheet system to manage its revolving fund inventory.

## **FINDING**

### **9. Emergency Backup Generator Testing**

WWCF did not ensure compliance with the DOC requirement for testing the emergency backup generator.

DOC policy directive 04.03.100 requires that emergency backup generators be tested weekly.

WWCF records showed that the weekly emergency generator tests had not been performed since May 1998. WWCF provided a letter from the manufacturer warning of the dangers of running the emergency generator with no-load for long periods of time. This letter stated that the no load test should be limited to 15 minutes. WWCF ceased to perform weekly emergency generator tests once the letter was received.

The weekly emergency generator tests do not require the generator to run longer than 15 minutes. Also, more than half of the steps required for the weekly emergency generator testing are performed before the generator is started.

WWCF should review inspection steps to determine if weekly inspections are harmful to the generator. WWCF should also determine if monthly inspections are adequate testing. Once determined, WWCF should get DOC approval to eliminate the weekly testing of the emergency backup generator to remain in compliance with the requirement.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

We recommend that WWCF ensure compliance with the DOC requirement for testing the emergency backup generator.

**AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE**

WWCF agrees and informed us that it has taken steps to comply by requesting a policy variance to test its emergency backup generator monthly instead of weekly. The manufacturer had advised WWCF that weekly tests of short duration may cause damage to the generator. The manufacturer had further advised WWCF that if no-load tests were absolutely necessary, the facility should limit them to 15 minutes.

## SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

## Description of Survey

We developed a survey requesting input from certain area individuals and businesses regarding their association with the Western Wayne Correctional Facility (WWCF) and Camp Brighton (CB).

We mailed surveys to 50 individuals and businesses located in the vicinity of WWCF and received 9 responses. A review of these responses indicated that most respondents had no opinion regarding the WWCF administration. However, some respondents were concerned about safety but did not know who to contact. We referred these community concerns to the warden for follow-up and provided her with a summary of this survey information.

We also mailed surveys to 50 individuals located in the vicinity of CB and received 17 responses. A review of the responses indicated that most respondents had no opinion regarding the camp and were concerned about safety but did not know who to contact. CB did not have a community liaison committee at the time of the survey and field visit. As noted in Finding 8, 15 responses indicated a need for CB to notify the community of problems and security situations related to it. We referred these community concerns to the warden for follow-up and provided her with a summary of this survey information.

WESTERN WAYNE CORRECTIONAL FACILITY (WWCF)  
AND CAMP BRIGHTON (CB)  
 Department of Corrections  
Summary of Survey Responses

Copies of Survey Distributed at Each Location: 50

WWCF:	Number of Responses	9	Response Rate	18%
CB:	Number of Responses	17	Response Rate	34%

1. How would you rate your satisfaction with the frequency of contacts between you or your organization and the Western Wayne Correctional Facility or Camp Brighton?

	<u>Highly Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u>	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
WWCF	2	0	0	0	5	2
CB	1	1	1	2	7	5

2. How satisfied are you with how management of the Western Wayne Correctional Facility or Camp Brighton has addressed your individual concerns?

	<u>Highly Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u>	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
WWCF	2	0	0	0	5	2
CB	1	1	0	2	7	6

3. How satisfied are you with the timeliness in which your individual concerns are addressed by the Western Wayne Correctional Facility or Camp Brighton?

	<u>Highly Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u>	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
WWCF	2	0	0	0	5	2
CB	2	0	1	3	6	5

4. How satisfied are you with the Western Wayne Correctional Facility's or Camp Brighton's process to notify the community of any problems or emergency situations related to the facility?

	<u>Highly Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u>	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
WWCF	1	2	0	0	4	2
CB	0	0	2	5	3	7

5. Do you have any specific safety or security concerns that have not been addressed by Western Wayne Correctional Facility or Camp Brighton personnel?

WWCF Yes: 1 No: 6 No Answer: 2

CB Yes: 8 No: 2 No Answer: 7

6. If you visited the Western Wayne Correctional Facility or Camp Brighton, were you satisfied with the security provided to you while at the facility?

	Highly Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Highly Dissatisfied	No Opinion	No Answer
WWCF	3	0	0	0	4	2
CB	2	0	0	0	8	7

7. Overall, how satisfied are you with the extent of communication between the Western Wayne Correctional Facility or Camp Brighton and the community?

	Highly Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Dissatisfied	Highly Dissatisfied	No Opinion	No Answer
WWCF	2	0	0	1	4	2
CB	1	0	5	2	5	4

## Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

CB	Camp Brighton.
cell search	The act of going through a prisoner's cell and belongings looking for contraband.
contraband	Property that is not allowed on facility grounds or in visiting rooms by State law, rule, or DOC policy. For prisoners, this includes any property that they are not specifically authorized to possess, authorized property in excessive amounts, or authorized property that has been altered without permission.
custody staff	Corrections officers and resident unit officers.
DOC	Department of Corrections.
effectiveness	Program success in achieving mission and goals.
efficiency	Achieving the most outputs and outcomes practical for the amount of resources applied or minimizing the amount of resources required to attain a certain level of outputs or outcomes.
gate manifest	A record used to control materials and supplies entering and leaving the facility through the front gates and sallyport.
housing unit officer	Corrections officers who work in the housing units.
medium security (level III)	A classification of prisoners who generally have longer sentences than do minimum security prisoners, who need more supervision but who are not likely to escape or are not difficult to manage. The classification covers institutions with individual rooms or cell.

minimum security (level I)	A classification of prisoners who can live in facilities with a minimum amount of security. They are normally relatively near parole.
mission	The agency's main purpose or the reason the agency was established.
performance audit	An economy and efficiency audit or a program audit that is designed to provide an independent assessment of the performance of a governmental entity, program, activity, or function to improve public accountability and to facilitate decision making by parties responsible for overseeing or initiating corrective action.
reportable condition	A matter coming to the auditor's attention that, in the auditor's judgment, should be communicated because it represents either an opportunity for improvement or a significant deficiency in management's ability to operate a program in an effective and efficient manner.
sallyport	A controlled, secure gate by which vehicles can enter the prison grounds through the perimeter fencing.
shakedown	The act of searching a prisoner, an employee, or a visitor to ensure that he/she does not have any contraband in his/her possession.
WWCF	Western Wayne Correctional Facility.